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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
DOMICIL FOR ORPHANS' COURT JURISDICTION
Shenton v. Abbott'
This is an appeal taken from an order of the Orphans'
Court of Baltimore City, revoking the probate of the will
of James E. Abbott, deceased, and also the letters testa-
mentary of Harry W. Shenton, appellant, on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
The facts showed that the testator, was born in An-
napolis, in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, and had lived
therein, except for a period of service with the army. In
1934, he gave up his Annapolis apartment and leased an
apartment in Baltimore City for one year. At the time,
he was a .member of the Veterans Commission and in
charge of its Baltimore office. Later his place of business
in Annapolis was also given up and the furnishings of the
two places were put into storage in Anne Arundel County.
From 1936 to 1939, he lived at various government hos-
pitals, clubs, homes of relatives, and apartment houses in
Baltimore. In July, 1939, returning from a stay in the
Washington Sanatorium, he took a room in a Baltimore
hotel. Here he was married and here, on July 27, one day
after his marriage, he executed his last will. In September
of the same year, he transferred real estate to himself and
his wife as tenants by the entireties, describing himself
in the deed as "of Anne Arundel County." The testator
and his wife then left for Florida, where three months later
he died, after having been away from Anne Arundel county
for five years except on occasional visits. The deceased
had large holdings both real and personal in Annapolis,
one house being bought there only two months before his
death. He had always kept his membership in an An-
napolis club. Furthermore, he had voted in an Anne
Arundel County election only one year before his death.
Upon the application for the marriage license, Mrs. Abbott
had sworn that the residence of the deceased was in An-
napolis. Appellant's evidence showed that Mr. Abbott's
address appeared on a roster of Veterans as Baltimore City
and that this city also appeared as his residence upon a
passenger list in 1936 when the testator made a steamship
cruise. Held: Upon the preponderance of the evidence,
the testator had his domicil in Annapolis at the time of
his death.
115 A. (2d) 906 (Md. 1940).
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The Maryland statute controlling the place of proof of
wills states that whenever any person shall die intestate,
leaving personal property within Maryland, letters of ad-
ministration shall be granted in the county where he had
his "mansion house or residence".2 It is also provided that
any will may be proved in any county wherein letters
testamentary or of administration may be granted. Since
the word "residence" in the statute has been held to be
synonymous with the word "domicil",4 the issue in the
present case was simply whether the testator had aban-
doned his domicil in Annapolis and had acquired a new
domicil in Baltimore City.'
Domicil was defined by the Court in the instant case
as "that place where a man has his true, fixed, permanent
home, habitation, and principal establishment, without any
present intention of removing therefrom, and to which
place he has, whenever he is absent, the intention of re-
turning".6 To effect a change of domicil, two simultan-
eously existing conditions are necessary, (1) acquisition of
a new dwelling place, and, (2) an intention to make that
dwelling place a home. The necessity for the concurrence
of the two conditions has often been adverted to in the
Maryland decisions. The requirement of this is the gen-
erally accepted view elsewhere, and it has recently been
approved in a note in this Review with reference to the
problem of domicil for purposes of taxation.7 This propo-
sition was stated by the Court in the principal case as
follows: "To effect a change of domicil there must be an
actual removal to another habitation, coupled with an in-
tention of remaining there permanently or at least for an
unlimited time." Later in the opinion it is stated that the
abandonment of the old domicil must be so permanent "as
to exclude the existence of an intention to return to the
former place." There must be both the "animus manendi"
and the "animus non revertendi".
2 Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, See. 15.
' Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 356.
'Whiting v. Shipley, 127 Md. 113, 96 A. 285 (1915).
r For purposes of the principal case and of this note, it is immaterial
whether his Annapolis domicil was his domicll of origin acquired there
by birth and continuing during his years of military service, because he
could not during such service acquire a different one (see RESTATEMENT,
CoNrLIc-r or LAWS, Sec. 21) ; or was a domicil of choice acquired upon his
retirement from military service.
' STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th Ed. 1883) Sec. 41.
'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, MD. ANNOT. (1936) Sees. 15, 18;
Note, What Determines Domicil (1939) 4 Md. L. Rev. 98.
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The instant case merely indicates a tendency to follow
the same general rules for determining residence under
the statutes determining Orphans' Court jurisdiction as
were followed in a number of earlier cases." The fact of
the two recent decisions on this question of domicil for
purposes of probate might be of interest. In Brafman v.
Brafman,9 the testator was born and had lived in Baltimore
City. In later life, his health began to fail and, in conse-
quence thereof, the testator visited various resorts along
the Atlantic Coast, mainly staying in Atlantic City during
the summers and in Florida during the winters. While
not at these places, the testator made his abode at Balti-
more hotels or with his brother or sister in that city. Dur-
ing a sojourn in Atlantic City, the deceased met his future
wife and the marriage occurred. On the marriage license,
the testator's residence was given as Baltimore City. Hus-
band and wife lived together in Atlantic City for six
months at various hotels and apartment houses until their
separation, after which the testator returned to his former
way of life. The testator's securities, investments, and
bank accounts were mainly in Baltimore City. Upon a
certificate of ownership filed for taxation purposes, his
residence was given as Baltimore. However, at various
times, the deceased had declared his residence to be in
Atlantic City. The Court held that the residence of Mr.
Brafman at the time of his death was in Baltimore, for
the facts, when weighed together, strongly indicated no
intention to abandon residence in Baltimore City. The
rule of law applied by the Court was that to establish a
change in domicil, the party seeking to establish such fact
must show first an actual removal to another habitation
and second, that the person removing did so with the in-
tention of remaining there, at least for an unlimited time.
In Pattison v. Firor,° the facts of which are not clearly
presented, the testatrix, Mrs. Pattison, had lived with her
husband in Howard County. After his death in 1915, she
remained there until some time later when, selling the
"The following cases deal with the question of domicil for purposes of
probate: Raborg v. Hammond, 2 H. & G. 42 (1827); Schultz v. Houck,
29 Md. 24 (1868) ; Ensor v. Graf, 43 Md. 291 (1875) ; Oberlander v. Emmel,
104 Md. 259, 64 A. 1025 (1906); Brafman v. Brafman, 144 Md. 413, 125 A.
161 (1924) ; Pattison v. Firor, 146 Aid. 243, 126 A. 109 (1924). In Stanley
v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 87 Md. 450, 40 A. 53 (1898), it was held
that unless appealed from in due time, the decision of the Orphans' Court
as to its jurisdiction was final, even though its ruling was unwarranted
by the facts.
o Brafman v. Brafman, supra n. 8.
10 Pattison v. Firor, supra n. 8.
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furniture, she rented out the house and moved away never
to return to live in her old home. She then made her abode
with various relatives at different times, among them being
her son-in-law Firor, who lived in Baltimore City. In
1918, the testatrix and Firor moved to Washington, D. C.
from which city, by 1920, they had again removed, this
time into a home upon the land of the testatrix in Howard
County, Firor renting the house there from Mrs. Pattison.
In the election of 1920, Mrs. Pattison both registered and
voted in Howard County. In the same year, she and her
son-in-law moved back to Baltimore where, several years
later, she died. Mrs. Pattison received all her mail at the
Baltimore address and kept her belongings there. Further-
more, she had declared that her home was in Baltimore
City, which place also appeared as her residence in the
descriptive clause of her last will. It appeared that the
home of Firor in Baltimore was the only abode of the
testatrix that had any permanency during the last four or
five years of her life. Upon petition to deny probate in
Baltimore City, the testatrix was held to have been domi-
ciled in Baltimore at the time of her death. The opinion
of the Court was that "while no one of these facts standing
alone might be adequate, yet taken together they are suffi-
cient to show a definite and certain intention of remaining
in Baltimore City for an indefinite time and of becoming a
resident of that city. Nor do we think the fact that, in
1920, she registered and voted in Howard County and kept
some money in a bank at Laurel should affect that con-
clusion." The statement of law made in the case was that
residence was lost by leaving one's permanent abode and
removing to another place "animus non revertendi", and
was gained by remaining in such new place "animus
manendi".
Both the Pattison and Brafman cases are squarely
within the rule that domicil is a place of fixed habitation
without any present intention of removing therefrom. Mr.
Brafman's stay in the resorts was for purposes of health
and his constant removals showed that in none of them
had he a present intention to remain for any definite period.
In the Pattison case, the testatrix would doubtless, if her
son-in-law had removed, followed him to a new abode, but
a present intention which is subject to a condition subse-
quent will not defeat a fixed residence.
In the instant case, Mr. Abbott was certainly not shown
to have abandoned his domicil at Annapolis. The deter-
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mination of domicil rests upon the facts of each case and
here they were preponderantly in favor of a finding that
the Annapolis domicil was retained. Mr. Abbott had voted
in Annapolis but one year before his death. As was said
by the Court, the exercise of sufferage furnishes strong,
although not conclusive, evidence of intention and may be
of slight importance if overbalanced by other circum-
stances, as was the case of Mrs. Pattison's vote. She had
voted in Howard County three years before her death, and
Mr. Abbott's vote was cast barely a year before his decease.
Further evidences of domiciliary intent are to be found
in the description of Mr. Abbott in the deed as being "of
Anne Arundel County", in the affidavit of his wife upon
the license to marry, and in the testimony of a witness
that Mr. Abbott intended to live in Anne Arundel County
if he ever settled down. Appellant's evidence as to the
address of Mr. Abbott being given as Baltimore City upon
the roster of veterans and upon the passenger list was
dismissed summarily by the Court, saying that it could not
place much value upon such lists, printed primarily for
temporary convenience, when compared with the declara-
tions of the deceased, the affidavits, and the circumstances
of the case.
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